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This paper contributes to the empirical literature on individual and household decisions to 
emigrate from developing countries to advanced economies. Considering both push and pull 
factors, it focuses on economic, financial and political crises as impulses augmenting 
migratory flows to Italy  and to Europe. 
Used for this purpose is the Ministry of the Interior database on immigration into Italy over 
1990-2000, with particular regard to illegal immigrants intercepted by the authorities. The 
data on immigration are supplemented with variables relative to the countries of origin. 
Econometric analysis confirms that the push factors activated by crises have had a statistically 
and quantitatively significant role in determining the amount of illegal immigration. 
These results have clear (international) policy implications: the costs of intervening to 
alleviate severe crises in the countries of origin should be weighed according to their ability to 
limit socially undesirable mass migrations towards the European Union.  
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1. Introduction 
During the 1990s, Italy, once the “land of voyagers, saints and emigrants”, 
became the main gateway into the European Union (EU) for illegal immigrants. 
Although estimating the clandestine population is a delicate exercise, involving 
problems of legal definitions and statistical methods, some OECD countries publish 
official figures for unauthorised immigrants, based on apprehensions at the border. 
Published data are often discontinuous. Statistics published by EUROSTAT show that 
38% of the 54,428 illegal immigrants apprehended in the European Community during 
the third quarter of 1999 had entered through Italy, followed by France (23%) and Spain 
(18%). In 1998, 40,201 were apprehended after illegally entering Germany; 16,500 in 
the UK and about 91,000 in Italy.
1
As the EU defines its policies on immigration – seeking to strike a balance 
between the needs of an ageing population no longer willing to accept unskilled work 
and the challenge of integrating the newcomers – increasing numbers of illegal 
immigrants reach Western Europe from poorer countries. But little is known about this 
phenomenon: there is only scant information available on legal immigrants and almost 
none at all about illegal ones. 
The literature generally divides the factors determining immigration into two main 
groups: ‘pull’ (or demand-side) factors and ‘push’ (or supply-side) factors. Among the 
former, the literature stresses institutional features and policies implemented in the host 
country, as well as other factors which determine the costs and expected benefits of 
immigration. These include the presence of social networks and the regulation of the 
labour market, which if too rigid may foster the growth of the black-market economy. 
Among push factors, since Harris and Todaro’s (1970) influential study, the literature 
has emphasised wage differentials between the host country and the home country. 
However, political and financial crises, social conflict and famine in the countries of 
origin may be of major importance for illegal immigration into the EU. 
The aim of this paper is to establish whether and to what extent the economic, 
financial and political crises that have hit countries of origin – particularly those in the 
neighbouring Mediterranean and the Balkan areas – have indeed intensified (illegal) 
migratory flows into the EU via Italy. These crises are factors additional to the 
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traditional determinants. Specifically, the paper analyses the trend of illegal immigration 
over time and by country of origin as approximated by the number of expulsion orders 
issued by the Italian authorities, which averaged 34,100 between 1991-93 and increased 
thereafter to reach 130,791 in 2000 and 149,783 in 2002. Besides studying the 
phenomenon of illegal immigration per se, we focus on illegal aliens rather than legal 
ones for two reasons: firstly, the former better approximate the migration inflow into 
Western Europe because many immigrants entering Italy are only in transit towards 
other EU destinations; secondly, considering illegal rather than legal immigrants purges 
the analysis from the distortions that would otherwise arise from the various amnesties 
granted in Italy over the period under study. The analysis is conducted for the period 
1990-2000, which comprises various crises that have erupted in, or close to, the 
Mediterranean basin (e.g. in the area inhabited by the Kurdish people) and in the 
Balkans (e.g. conflicts in the former Yugoslavia or the various crises in Albania). 
Our findings confirm that generally-defined “crises in home countries” 
significantly amplify illegal immigration into (or through) Italy. To that extent, our 
econometric estimates detect the occurrence of a quantitatively-significant increase in 
the proportion of illegal immigrants entering Italy from crisis-hit countries. In 
particular, when a country suddenly moves from a situation of ‘moderate risk’ to one of 
‘very high risk’ (according to the ICRG Risk Rating System described below), the share 
of illegal immigrants from that country increases by around two percentage points. 
Our results therefore suggest possible consequences of the different future policy 
directions on immigration control in both Italy and the European Union in the face of 
crises in neighbouring countries. Specifically, among the options for the EU, an 
interventionist policy that aims at preventing mass immigration by promptly lessening 
the effect of crises in the origin country may be more cost-effective than non-
intervention accompanied by increased national patrolling and controls on the borders. 
In the remaining of the paper, Section 2 synthesises the main tenets of the 
literature as to the major determinants of illegal migration. Section 3 describes both the 
legal and illegal migration choice by means of a cost-benefit approach. The bulk of the 
paper (Section 4) features the explanation of the data, discusses some descriptive 
evidence and presents the results of the econometric estimates. Section 5 gathers the 
concluding remarks. 
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2. Recent literature on the determinants of illegal migration 
By definition, an immigrant is illegal if he contravenes the law by entering a 
country without adequate visa (or remaining in it after his visa expired), and if he does 
not hold the status of “political refugee”. Because of its very nature, therefore, the 
magnitude of the phenomenon in the EU cannot be accurately measured. Nevertheless, 
using data from border control authorities on apprehensions, illegal trespassing and 
detentions, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) has 
estimated in 1993 the annual flow of illegal immigrants into the EU at around 350,000; 
using the ILO’s calculation, the irregular foreign stock would correspond to 10-15% of 
the size of the officially recorded resident foreign population, which was around 20 
million in 1997.
2
Although the literature on the subject continues to grow, the motives for 
emigration and the effects of the presence of immigrants in the host country have still to 
be fully explained. Most empirical research on these aspects has concentrated on 
immigration into the United States (especially illegal immigration from Mexico; see 
Hanson, 2006). This is probably due to the fact that the US has historically been the 
main migrant receiver due to the higher wages. Yet European immigration differs from 
that of the US for various reasons (see Coppel, Dumont and Visco, 2001): net flows into 
the EU grew during the 1980s, peaking in the 1990s owing to wars and ethnic conflicts. 
These specific historical events, together with tighter controls at European borders, have 
reduced the flow of legal immigrants and increased the flow of illegal ones.
3 Therefore, 
for historical and geo-political reasons, immigrants into the EU have demographic 
characteristics and expectations that differ substantially from those of immigrants into 
the United States. Moreover, to a certain extent, European immigration may be 
temporary in nature. 
The theoretical and applied literature on immigration necessarily refer to the 
pioneer work by Harris and Todaro (1970). In their model, the decision to emigrate is 
caused by wage differences in three distinct labour markets: a competitive agricultural 
                                                           
2 See Hilderink et al. (2003). 
3 For a theoretical analysis of the effects of illegal immigration to the receiving countries (in particular, 
domestic consumption) see Hazari and Sgro (2000 and 2003). 
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market, an urban market with a wage rate above the equilibrium level, and an informal 
urban sector which guarantees a subsistence-level income to the unemployed resident in 
the area
4. 
Although the wage rigidity hypothesis is to some extent plausible, especially with 
reference to Europe, Harris and Todaro’s explanation of immigration movements solely 
in terms of wage differences is too simplistic. Later studies have observed that 
emigration from poor countries increases as economic development takes place in the 
origin country (see Hatton and Williamson, 2002, and others), detecting, in particular, 
an hump-shaped relationship, although the debate on the link between convergence in 
the source region and labour mobility is still open (see Faini 1996). Moreover, they 
have documented and interpreted the importance of close economic interactions 
between immigrants and their communities of origin (see Lucas and Stark, 1985; 
Rosenzweig, 1988; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Borjas, 1994). For altruistic reasons or 
through implicit contracts, families finance migration, as a way to diversify income 
risks, by supplying family labour in various productive sectors in the country and 
abroad. 
Moreover, emigrant workers usually select their final destinations on the basis of 
relationships formed in their countries of origin, given that social networks reduce the 
initial costs of job seeking and improve the prospects of evading the underground 
economy. There are, in addition, factors that are not strictly economic – for instance 
language, cultural and geographical contiguity, historical and colonial links – affecting 
the decision to emigrate and the choice of the destination country. 
 
                                                           
4 Faini and Venturini (1993) document the importance of wage differentials in explaining migrations from 
the South to the North of the Mediterranean basin. 
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3. A cost-benefit approach to illegal immigration 
Together with the factors discussed above, the choice of illegal immigration is 
also conditioned by the risks of being apprehended and thereby of seeing all costs to 
immigrate prove fruitless (see Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999a and 1999b). Moreover, 
and this is the aim of this paper, we need to consider the trigger effect that crises may 
have on the (illegal) migration choice. 
To this end, following Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999a), we take a cost-benefit 
approach to the migration choice based on the life cycle hypothesis and augment their 
formalisation to account for the occurrence of a crisis in the country of origin. 
Let us consider VO,t as the current value of future earnings in the origin country of 
the illegal migrant and wO,t as the wage for period t (in years). Similarly, VD,t is the 
current value of future earnings in the destination country, the EU in our case. Let us 
also assume that there is a fixed cost CO,t of migrating that depends, for instance, on the 
distance between the origin and the destination country capturing transportation costs. 
CO,t can also comprise costs of adaptation to the destination country (e.g. periods of 
unemployment) that have to be “paid” once. As such, the existence of a well-established 
network of nationals in the destination country may decrease the emigration cost CO,t.  
Given these variables and assuming that it takes one period to reach the 
destination country, an individual will decide to migrate if: 
 
,, 1 , 1
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11




, C      [1] 
 
In other words, the decision to migrate takes place if the expected flow of future 
earnings in the origin country (left-hand side) is lower than the expected flow of income 
at destination after paying for the emigration costs. This represents the choice for legal 
immigrants. 
For illegal immigrants two additional elements must be added: firstly, the sudden 
and unexpected occurrence of crises that can trigger the immediate (and illegal) 
departure from the origin country; secondly, the possibility of being apprehended as an 
illegal alien once in the destination country. 
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The unexpected crisis factor affects negatively the left-hand side of eq. [1] and 
can be modelled as a random variable  , Ot Z  . Moreover, the possibility of being 
apprehended once in the destination country is represented by the probability   of 
being caught and we assume that this probability is the same for any country of origin. 
If the illegal immigrant is caught at period 
t P
(1 t ) + , he is immediately sent back home 
and his discounted life time income is VO,t+1. With probability (1 ) t P −  he settles in the 
destination country and earns VD,t+1. We assume that the probability of being 
apprehended is an increasing function of the intensity of the border controls,  , in the 
destination country:  and 
t L





> . Hence, equation [1] changes as follows: 
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Let us denote with   the number of illegal immigrants coming at time t from 
the origin country O. For each one of them Eq. [2] holds. Hence,   is a function of 
all the variables contained in Eq. [2]: 
, Ot N
, Ot N
    [3]  , , ,1 ,1 , , (, , ,,, Ot Ot Ot Dt Ot Ot t NN w V VZ C L ++ = 
 
This relationship represents the sort of reduced form of Eq. [2] that will be 
estimated in our panel-data framework. According to our analysis, we expect that flows 
of illegal migrants from a specific country NO,t should decrease in wO,t , VO,t+1 , CO,t and 
Lt whereas it should increase in VD,t+1 and  t O Z ,
~
. These hypotheses will be tested in the 
empirical analysis below. 
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4. Migratory flows into Italy: an empirical analysis 
The aim of our empirical analysis is the estimation of Eq. [3]. In this section we 
first describe the main characteristics of our data set. The estimation results follow the 
general statistical description of the data. 
 
4.1. The data 
To examine each determinant mentioned above, we used the Italian Ministry of 
the Interior database for the years 1990-2000. This contains time series of the flows of 
illegal immigrants into Italy distinguished by country of origin and approximated by the 
number of expulsion orders.
5 The total number of expulsion orders issued in each year 
is taken as a proxy for  . More precisely, this was calculated as the sum of the illegal 
immigrants that were: (i) refused entry at the border; (ii) refused entry by the police 
authorities; (iii) expelled with escort; (iv) readmitted by countries with which Italy has a 
readmission agreement; (v) expelled by the judicial authorities; (vi) expelled on 
injunction (see Appendix 1 for a detailed description). 
, Ot N
According to Eq. [3] the explicative variables can be grouped into three 
categories: income variables  , immigration costs   and intensity 
of border controls  . In addition, we want to focus on the effect of the crises, 
i.e.
,, 1 , 1 (, , Ot Ot Dt wV V ++ ) ) , ( ot C
( ) t L
, Ot Z  . 
Income variables include both the current flow of income and the expected future 
earnings in the origin and at the destination country. Since the destination country is 
Italy or other European countries and their per capita income slightly changed during 
the decade 1990-2000, we considered only income in the different origin countries. This 
has been approximated with “net per-capita national income” as reported by World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Immigration costs are assumed to depend (non-linearly) on the geographical 
distance between Italy and each one of the origin countries (capital-to-capital geodetic 
                                                           
5 We would stress that the indicator used is only an approximation of the actual inflow of illegal 
immigrants. On the one hand, it is an under-approximation because only a proportion of illegal 
immigrants are effectively intercepted and expelled; on the other, the indicator may give rise to over-
estimation of the phenomenon if, as possible under the Italian immigration law for that period, an 
expulsion order were not enforced and the illegal alien may be stopped more than once; in this case, the 
same illegal immigrant may have been the recipient of more than one expulsion order. 
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distance). However, as stressed in the literature, we also assume that a “social network 
effect”, i.e. the presence of an already numerous community from the country of origin 
at destination, may alleviate immigration costs (for instance, by reducing job search 
costs). Hence, as an approximation of the pre-existence of social networks, we also 
considered the number of legal immigrants resident in Italy by country of provenance at 
the beginning of each year, as reported in the official Italian statistics (ISTAT Annual 
Report). We expect this variable to be positively related to migration flows. 
With regards to proxies for the intensity of border control, data are secreted and 
only very general statistics are available from official sources. However, in our panel-
data framework the “between” dimension may help identify implicitly the effect of 
border controls. Under the assumption that border controls are not different depending 
on the country of origin,
6 they are represented by a time effect (common to all 
“individuals”, i.e. countries of origin, but changing over time).
7
Finally, as the main objective of this analysis, we focus on the effect of crises 
bursting as a push factor. For this scope we use a measure of the political, economic and 
financial risk in the country of origin as rated by international statistical sources with 
the ICRG index (see Appendix 2 for a description): when a sudden and intense drop in 
the ICRG indicator occurs, then we assume that a crisis has occurred. 
 
4.2. Descriptive evidence 
The total number of expulsion orders issued to illegal immigrants in Italy 
increased markedly between 1990 and 1994 (from 10,000 to 57,000), stabilized in 1995, 
fell in 1996-97 (to 35,000 and 49,000), almost doubled in 1998 (91,000), and then rose 
sharply again, reaching a peak of 131,000 in 2000 (Fig. 1). Of course, as Hanson and 
Spilimbergo (1999b) also point out, the share of illegal immigrants intercepted depends 
on the stringency of border enforcement – that is, the amount of resources (police and 
judicial) allocated for the purpose by the authorities – but it also depends on the 
                                                           
6 This assumption is confirmed by the distribution of hours of total patrolling in 1998-2000 (the years 
after the Albania 1997 crisis and the period of the Kosovo war). There is no evidence of a significant 
increase in hours of patrolling in the Adriatic sea (i.e. the border sea between Italy and the Balkans) with 
respect to other areas. The data are available from the authors upon request.   
7 We also considered specific country and time dummies capturing the effect produced by re-admission 
agreements that the Italian government has signed with some countries of origin of illegal immigrants 
since 1996. As a result of these agreements, migrants coming from those countries and apprehended in 
  8   
effectiveness of the legal framework. Hence, the number of expulsion orders increased 
sharply in 1998, which was the year when a new law on immigration was enacted, just 
as the decrease in expulsion orders in the previous two years was probably due to 
uncertainty about what changes would be made to the legal framework and because a 
large amnesty took place in 1996. 
Analysis of the main motives for migration cannot base itself solely on temporal 
trends in the aggregate series. It must also examine the cross-sectional dimension of the 
data, or in other words, the home countries of intercepted illegal immigrants. Our 
empirical analysis therefore considered 118 countries of origin,
8 all those for which (a) 
details were available from the Ministry of the Interior database and (b) the data were 
systematically different from 0 for the majority of the years between 1990 and 2000.
9
Table 1 illustrates the first 15 countries of origin (in terms of quantitative 
importance) of illegal immigration into Italy between 1990 and 2000. It shows the 
averages (and, in brackets, the standard deviations) of the main variables used in the 
empirical analysis. The home country with the highest number of illegal immigrants is 
Albania, which has an annual average value of 11,800 units, followed by Morocco 
(6,600), Yugoslavia and Romania (3,600), and Tunisia (2,400). The highest average 
number of legal immigrants comes from Morocco (73,500), followed by Albania 
(44,200), Tunisia (36,500) and Yugoslavia (31,000). 
The effect of possible distortions due to amnesties and changes to immigration 
law can be attenuated by considering the share of illegal immigrants by country of 
origin (see Figure 2). Two countries had the highest shares during the 1990s: Morocco 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Italy, at their arrival are immediately repatriated, without any need of identification. However, the lack of 
an encouraging evidence took us not to model them explicitly. 
8 Namely Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Arab Emirates, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina-Faso, 
Burma, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, C.I.S./Russia, Cuba, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, 
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
9 We excluded 18 countries (Barbados, Burundi, Centro-African Republic, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chad, 
Comoros Islands, Dominica, Djbuti, Kirghizstan, Laos, Lesotho, Nepal, Seychelles, Swaziland, 
Tajikistan, Tonga, Uzbekistan) from which there were no migrants for at least 4 years in a row. 
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from 1990 to 1994 (with values between 18.6% and 23.9%) and Albania between 1995 
and 2000 (with shares varying from 20.5% in 1995 to 33.7% in 1998). During the 
period considered, the share of illegal immigrants grew in the case not only of Albania 
but also Romania, while it displayed a seesaw pattern for Yugoslavia and a U-shaped 
one for Morocco and Tunisia (see again Figure 2). 
Since the aim of our research is to establish whether and to what extent the 
various pull and push factors are influential (in particular the crisis factor), we then 
consider the numbers of illegal immigrants (as shown in Figure 1) and their bivariate 
statistical relations with three main factors (apart from differences in per-capita 
incomes): (i) a second order polynomial in the distance from Italy, which approximates 
the cost of migration; (ii) the extent to which there are social networks of co-nationals 
(legally resident immigrants) in Italy, which is likely to alleviate immigration costs; (iii) 
political-economic-financial crises in the country of origin. 
Figure 3 confirms that there is a convex relationship (expressed by the U shape of 
the fitted line) between the distance of the country of origin from Italy and the share of 
illegal immigrants from the same country. We shall see below that a gravity model 
widely used in the literature on international trade is also confirmed as regards illegal 
immigration (see, for instance, Venturini, 2003, for a survey of the literature on the use 
of the gravity approach to legal migration). 
Next, Figure 4 relates the share of illegal immigrants (vertical axis) to the stock of 
foreign citizens residing in Italy at time (t-1) (horizontal axis). The data are averages 
between 1993 and 2000, years for which more numerous statistics on legal immigration 
into Italy are available. The graph shows a positive relation between the extent of the 
social network of co-nationals from the home country and the flow of illegal immigrants 
from that country. 
Finally, we consider the crisis index. Figure 5 considers the relation between the 
occurrence of a crisis in a country of origin and the flow of illegal immigrants from the 
same country. Specifically, a country’s risk is measured every year by the ICRG index 
(in a scale from 0 to 100), as described in Appendix 2. When the ICRG risk indicator 
falls (rises) for a country, then its political, financial and economic risk increases 
(decreases). In particular, Figure 5 considers the relation between a negative change in 
the country of origin’s rating (i.e. the occurrence of a “crisis”) and the percentage 
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change in the number of illegal immigrants. In order to construct Figure 5, we selected 
all major crisis episodes: that is, ones in which a country’s rating decreased by at least 
5% from one year to the next. For those pairs “year - country of origin”, the graph 
shows that the drop in the rating (expressed in absolute value on the previous year on 
the horizontal axis) and the annual rate of change of illegal immigrants entering Italy 
(vertical axis) are negatively related. In other words, the steeper the fall in the rating 
(i.e. the more severe the crisis), the greater the increase in illegal immigration. 
Although the descriptive evidence supports our a priori, this is certainly not 
definite and a multivariate econometric analysis is necessary. The results are set out in 
the next section. 
 
4.3. Econometric analysis 
When choosing the dependent variable of our study, we faced the problem of the 
potentially large measurement error affecting the number of illegal immigrants as 
proxied by the number of expulsion orders. As a consequence, we decided to consider 
the share of illegal immigrants by country of origin out of the total number of expulsion 
orders. We assume that the potential measurement error would affect both the 
numerator and the denominator of our dependent variable in a similar way. Regarding 
the explanatory variables, we can group them into the three categories discussed above: 
variables representing income differences as a push factor, variables representing 
immigration costs and social network effects, finally variables representing the crisis 
effect. The data used and the relative sources are described and reported in Appendix 3.  
The estimation of the panel has been performed for the 118 nationality shares and 
for the ten years 1990-2000. Both the Breusch-Pagan and the Hausman tests confirm the 
validity of the random-effect-model approach.
10 The results are reported in Tables 2 and 
3.  
All the variables representing the traditional push factors have the expected signs. 
Population and per capita income have been both inserted in order to allow National 
Income to be a possible explanatory variable. Actually, the variable “population” is 
never significant (at the usual confidence levels) and only “per capita income” in the 
                                                           
10 The Hausman test had to be performed on a more reduced specification, due to the lack of identification 
of time invariant variables in a fixed effect model. Results of the test are not reported, but are available 
upon requests from the authors. 
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country of origin shows the expected negative sign: when per capita income in the 
country of origin increases, the share of illegal immigrants coming from that country 
decreases.
11
Regarding the immigration costs, four variables have been included: distance, 
squared distance, a language dummy and a religion dummy. In other words, we want to 
consider not only the physical distance, but also the “cultural” distance between Europe-
Italy and the various countries of origin, as also stressed in the estimation of gravity 
models in international trade. Both distance regressors are significant, but the linear 
distance has a negative effect, whereas the squared distance has a positive effect. This 
evidence shows a non-negligible nonlinear effect consistent with what already found in 
the bivariate analysis. Among the religious conviction dummies, the “Christian 
religion” one is statistically significant with a negative sign, taking as reference 
categories Islamic religion, Animism, Buddhism and Hinduism; this is probably due to 
(and not only) massive presence of Muslim countries among the origins of many 
illegals. 
The social network effect is represented by the number of male legal immigrants 
from the same country of origin that were present in Italy in the previous year
12. The 
network effect is significant and has the correct sign. 
Finally, different crisis variables are introduced and they are discussed in further 
details below. The estimation included also a time dummy in some specifications in 
order to take account of the change in the border controls during the period here 
analysed. 
Regarding the crisis factor, all the different specifications point to its significant 
role. The simple risk measure of the country of origin is not always significant. 
However, the interaction of the risk measure with its change appears to be much more 
important. 
The variable ICRG is first interacted with a dummy representing a nonlinear effect 
of its change. In other words, Dcrisis is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the 
drop in ICRG during the current year is so strong to pull down the risk factor into the 
                                                           
11 We did not find any evidence of a non linear impact of the income variable in the source country, as 
instead found by previous literature for legal migration. 
12 Similar results were found also when considering the total number of legal migrants from the same 
country. 
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high risk region (i.e. below the value of 49.5). Hence, the interaction Dcrisis ×ICRG 
represents indirectly the effect of a crisis: when a crisis is so intense to increase the risk 
associated to the country up to the “high-risk” bracket, then the risk level becomes 
important. As Table 2 shows, such nonlinear effect is significant in all the specifications 
and has both a contemporaneous and a lagged effect (see also Table 3). 
A further important piece of evidence is represented by the effect of a 
geographically widespread crisis. We constructed a macro ICRG, i.e. for each country 
we considered all the border countries and computed a simple average of the ICRG 
indexes. Similarly to the country-specific ICRG and the dummy variable Dcrisis, we 
constructed the analogous dummy variable but referred to the area-wide ICRG. The 
dummy D-macro-crisis then takes the value 1 when the area wide ICRG drops below 
the threshold of 49.5 and the macro area is ranked as “highly risky” on average. 
Although the sign of the interaction D-macro-crisis ×macro-ICRG shows the correct 
sign, its coefficient is not significant even at the 10 percent level. 
When considering also other types of crises than political or economic ones, we 
included dummy variables for the years in which there have been natural disasters, 
conflicts and famine in the country of origin. However, only the “famine” dummy result 
to be significant at the 5 per cent level and with a negative sign. 
In order to consider possible dynamic effects, Table 3 shows the same regression 
3 from Table 2, but with lagged regressors. The interaction between the occurrence of a 
crisis and the final high-risk situation of a country is still significant at 1- and 2-year 
lags, whereas the insignificant contemporaneous effect of the risk level of the country of 
origin becomes significant at the 1- and 2-year lag (the latter one only at the 10 per cent 
level). In other words, when the country falls into the high-risk bracket, the impact of 
this on emigration are persistent through time. 
The whole analysis is based on the idea that the ICRG measure is exogenous with 
respect to our dependent variable (i.e. the share of illegal immigrants by country of 
origin into the total of illegal immigrants). We cannot however exclude that the 
causality may run the other way around or that residents of countries hit by crises may 
anticipate the crisis, and leave it, possibly aggravating the crisis. In such a case our 
estimates would be biased and inconsistent and we would need resort to instrumental 
variable estimation. 
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Alesina et al. (2002) has shown that ethnic fractionalization is a good measure of 
the economic performance of a country. They found that countries ethnically more 
homogeneous exhibit better performance. Ethnic fractionalization is then a valid 
instrument, because it is an exogenous variable with respect to the flow of migrants and 
because it is correlated with the ICRG index. As a matter of fact, a simple bivariate 
regression of the ICRG on the ethnic fractionalization (as measured by the data 
provided in Alesina et al., 2002) cannot reject the presence of positive correlation 
between the two variables. Hence, we decided to estimate again equation 3 of Table 2, 
but employing an IV approach, using ethnic fractionalization to instrument ICRG. The 
results, contained in column 4 -Table 2, confirm the same findings as in the rest of 
Table 2 and in Table 3. 
 
5. Conclusions 
To what extent do crises in countries of origin intensify migration from the poor 
countries to the rich ones? This paper has sought to provide a preliminary answer to this 
question by analysing, for the last decade, the determinants of migration by illegal 
immigrants subject to expulsion orders in Italy, i.e. the country which has become the 
main gateway for illegal entrants into the European Union. 
In analysing the phenomenon, besides crisis factors, we considered also other 
indicators representing the costs and expected benefits of emigration. We focused on 
illegal immigrants because illegality has become the main mode for migrants seeking to 
enter the EU as the regulation of the legal flows of migrants grew increasingly 
restrictive. 
The main findings of our analysis confirm that crises in the countries of origin 
significantly increase influxes of illegal immigrants into (and through) Italy. The 
econometric estimates show that this effect gives rise to a sizeable quantitative increase 
in the number of illegal immigrants originating from a country in crisis. For example, 
when the ICRG indicator falls by twenty percentage points, as it did in the case of 
Albania in 1997, there is a fully 38% increase in the number of illegal immigrants! That 
is to say, on the basis of the expulsion orders issued in 2000 for Albania alone, the crisis 
in that country increased the number of illegal immigrants from that country by around 
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11,700 units per year; a number which may be largely underestimated, in fact, given 
that only a minor proportion of the illegal immigrants entering Italy are intercepted. 
Our findings therefore provide indications for future policy-making in both Italy 
and Europe. They can be used to disentangle the effects implicit in the various policy 
options that the European Union and, more in general, the international organizations 
may have to face with future crises. Our estimates allow to compare the economic 
consequences of an interventionist policy (which may prevent mass migrations with 
large-scale aid) and a non-interventionist policy which allows the push factors activated 
by crises to generate such mass migrations. Usually a non-interventionist policy must 
become a post-interventionist policy with increasing costs in terms of (strict) 
immigration-law enforcement and intense border controls. Even on the sole economic 
ground, given the quite high elasticity that was estimated, we doubt that such post-
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Appendix 1 
The flow of illegal immigrant by country of origin 
The measures on the basis of which we approximated the number of illegal immigrants 
in Italy were the following: 
Refused entry at the border: foreigners turned away at the border due to their non-
fulfilment of the requirements prescribed by law (23.6% in 2000); 
Refused entry by the police (since 1998): foreigners who have entered Italian territory 
by evading border controls and have been apprehended on entry or shortly afterwards 
(8.7% in 2000); 
Expelled under escort (11.5% in 2000), including: 
- foreigners expelled for reasons of public order or public security by order of 
the Ministry of the Interior; 
- foreigners expelled by order of the Prefect because (a) they have unlawfully 
remained on Italian territory beyond the term set by the injunction (see below); 
(b) they are deemed a threat to public safety and morality because suspected of 
belonging to Mafia-style organizations, and when the Prefect decides that there 
is a significant likelihood that they will not comply with an injunction; (c) they 
have entered Italian territory by evading border controls and have not been 
ejected by the Police because they do not possess a valid identity document and 
the Prefect decides that there is a significant likelihood that they will not comply 
with an injunction. 
Readmitted by a country under a readmission agreement: foreigners returned to their 
country of origin or provenance under a specific readmission agreement (6.5% in 2000); 
Expelled by the judicial authorities: foreigners expelled by order of the judicial 
authorities (0.3% in 2000) because they have (i) been convicted of offences and are 
deemed socially dangerous; (ii) sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not more than 
two years which the judge has substituted with an expulsion order; 
Expelled on injunction (49.5% in 2000): foreigners expelled with an injunction to leave 
Italian territory within 15 days issued by the Prefect because: (i) they have remained on 
Italian territory without applying for a stay permit within the period prescribed, or if the 
stay permit has been revoked or annulled or has lapsed for more than 60 days with no 
application made for its renewal; (ii) they have entered Italian territory by evading 
border controls but are in possession of a valid identity document and/or if the Prefect 
does not decide that there is a significant likelihood that the foreigner will not comply 
with the injunction; deemed dangerous to public security and public morality being 
suspected of belonging to Mafia-style organizations and when the Prefect does not 
decide that there is a significant likelihood that the foreigner will not comply with the 
injunction. 
 





The ICRG Risk Rating system assigns a numerical value to a predefined group of risk 
components, according to a pre-set scale of values and for a large number of countries, 
the aim being to allow for comparability among country risk levels. Each scale is 
defined by awarding the highest value to the lowest risk, and the lowest value to the 
highest risk. 
The index used in this paper is a composite indicator of political, financial and 
economic risk. The indicator of political risk makes up 50% of the composite indicator, 
while the indicators of financial and economic risk each account for 25% of it.  
The scale of values is as follows: 
Very high risk       00.0 to 49.5  
High risk         50.0 to 59.5 
Moderate risk        60.0 to 69.5 
Low  risk     70.0  to  79.5 
Very low risk        80.0 to 100. 
 
The  political risk indicator is an average of various indicators of political stability. 
These indicators include political stability in the strict sense (measured by assessing 
government unity, legislative strength and popular support), socio-economic conditions 
(e.g. unemployment and the poverty level), the investment profile (measured by delays 
in payment and expropriations), internal and external conflicts (civil wars, terrorism, 
civil disorder, external pressure, cross-border conflict), corruption, the presence of the 
military in politics, the involvement of religion in politics, ‘law and order’, ethnic 
tensions, democracy (alternating democracy, autarchy, the de facto or de jure presence 
of only a one-party state), the quality of the bureaucracy. 
The economic risk indicator is derived from an assessment based on per-capita GDP, 
the growth of real GDP, the annual inflation rate, and the balance of payments as a 
percentage of GDP.  
The financial risk indicator is based on foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, the foreign 
debt as a percentage of exports, net international liquidity, exchange rate stability. 
 
 
                                                           
13 In the case of 9 out of the 118 countries considered, for which ratings are not calculated by ICRG, we 
imputed ratings calculated according to the following formulas : (i) Afghanistan=(Iran+Pakistan)/2; (ii) 
Republic of Benin=(Niger+Nigeria+Togo)/3 ;  (iii)  Bosnia-Herzegovina=(Croatia+Yugoslavia)/2 ;  (iv) 
Eritrea=(Ethiopia+Somalia)/2; (v) Macedonia=(Albania+Yugoslavia)/2 ; (vi) Mauritania= (Algeria+Mali 
+Morocco+Senegal)/4; (vii) Mauritius=(Madagascar+Mozambique)/2; (viii) Ruanda=(Tanzania 
+Zaire)/2. For more details on the index, see http://www.countrydata.com. 
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Appendix 3. 
 
Other variables used and data sources 
 
 
Per capita income: World Bank, Development Indicators, various issues. 
Population: World Bank, Development Indicators, various issues. 
Distance: geodetic distance between Rome and the capitals of all the countries of 
origins; sources:  
-  http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0001769.htm  
-  http://www.mindspring.com/~jackkarnes 
Language - indoeuropean: dummy variable equal to 1 when the language in the 
country of origin of the illegal immigrants has an Indo-European root; source: Atlas 
2004 Zanichelli.  
Main religion – Christian: dummy variable equal to 1 when the main religion in the 
country of origin of the illegal immigrants is Christian, 0 otherwise; source: Atlas 2004- 
Zanichelli. 
Male legals(t-1): number of male legal immigrants present in Italy in the year before; 
source: Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), Annual Report, various issues. 
ICRG: see Appendix 2 
Macro ICRG: simple average of the ICRG index values of the country i and all its 
border countries. 
Dcrisis: dummy variable that takes value of 1 when the change in the ICRG index pulls 
down the index below 49.5, i.e. the upper threshold for the “high risk” range. 
D macro crisis: same as Dcrisis but referred to macro ICRG. 
Disaster: dummy variable that takes value of 1 when natural disasters occurred in the 
year in the country source: OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database 
(http://www.cred.be/emdat - Université Catholique de Louvain - Brussels – Belgium) 
Conflict: dummy variable that takes value of 1 when conflicts occurred in the year in 
the country source: OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. 
Famine: dummy variable that takes value of 1 when famine occurred in the year in the 
country source: OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. 
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Figure 3: Relation between the share of illegal immigrants (averages 1990-2000) 
and the distance (in thousands km) between Italy and the country of origin  
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Figure 4: Relation between the share of illegal immigrants and the stock of 
resident foreign population (in thousands) by country of origin  
(averages 1993-2000) 
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Figure 5: Change in illegal immigrant share by country of origin and “crises” in 
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Table 1 
Data description 
The table shows the averages and, in brackets, the standard deviations of the principal variables 
used in our empirical analysis of the first 15 countries of origin of immigrants into Italy from 
1990 to 2000. The averages and standard deviations of the numbers of illegal immigrants and 
the relative quotas have been obtained from the Ministry of the Interior database, while those 
relative to legal immigrants resident in Italy have been taken from ISTAT statistics (2000). 
 
 
Albania Algeria   China 
No. Illegals  11827,00   (11611,00) 2235   (1124,39) 1512,64   (1423,34)
Share Illegals          0,17   (0,12)      0,05   (0,02)      0,02   (0,01)
Geog. Distance.       972,58  1099,2 8076,1 
ICRG index        56,1   (7,03)   55,61   (2,61)    70,21   (5,68)
No. Legals  44159,00   (26,75) 6961,33   (4782,03) 22840   (12019,87)
 
Ghana Iran  Iraq 
No. Illegals     815,18   (478,95) 801,82   (2171,80) 1374,00   (1862,10)
Share Illegals         0,02   (0,01)        0,008   (0,018) 0,02   (0,02)
Geog. Distance.   4532,1     3682,60 3280,7 
ICRG Index       60,80   (2,74)       63,53   (8,54) 32,85   (7,05)
No. Legals  11800,73   (2968,07) 5847,18   (365,20) 1176,91   (393,78)
 
Yugoslavia Macedonia Morocco 
No. Illegals  3551,73   (2527,57) 819,09   (853,61) 6640,09   (2649,40)
Share illegals       0,08   (0,04)      0,01   (0,01) 0,15   (0,07)
Geog. Distance.        888,27      1057,3 1864,6 
ICRG Index    43,67   (6,16)       49,89   (5,91) 68,11   (6,21)
No. Legals  31009,91   (5665,53) 11640,75   (5657,97) 73526,36   (48850,81)
 
Nigeria Poland Romania 
No. Illegals  1921,27   (851,25) 1396,18   (738,07) 3625,18   (3492,85)
Share illegals  0,04   (0,03)      0,03   (0,01) 0,06   (0,03)
Geog. Distance.    4045,4      1143,6 1337,5 
ICRG Index      54,89   (3,15)  72,52   (7,98) 59,96   (4,92)
No. Legals  7699,30   (4462,90) 15951,09   (5810,28) 17489,09   (10943,45)
 
Senegal Tunisia Turkey 
No. Illegals  1286,64   (1067,99) 2412,27   (660,03) 1611,46   (1730,53)
Share illegals  0,03   (0,02)   0,06   (0,04)      0,03   (0,02)
Geog. Distance.       4233,9       963,38 2018,8 
ICRG Index      59,87   (3,06)   68,59   (5,61) 56,95   (7,05)
No. Legals  26061,64   (1781,63) 36532,18   (6307,97) 3769,73   (924,99)
 
Ukraine 
No. Illegals  816,91   (1284,36)
Share illegals      0,01   (0,01)
Geog. Distance.      1672,3 
ICRG Index       61,34   (3,55)
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Table 2 
The push and pull factors of mass migration to Italy: panel analysis with random effects 
 
 Dependent var.: share of irregulars by country of origin 
  1 2 3 4 
Constant  0.0640 0.0647  _  0.0621   
Std.err. 0.0086 0.0087  _ 0.0093   
Population   0.0149 0.0146 0.0148 0.0145   
Std.err. 0.0096 0.0092 0.0093 0.0100 
Per capita Income/1000    -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0006  
std.err. 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 
Distance/1000  -0.0129 -0.0128 -0.0127 -0.0128 
Std.err. 0.0019 0.0018 0.0018 0.0019 
(Distance/1000)^2  0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009   
Std.err. 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
Language: indo-european  0.0024  0.0023  0.0025  0.0025   
Std.err. 0.0037 0.0035 0.0036 0.0039 
Main religion: Christian  -0.0096 -0.0095 -0.0094 -0.0099 
Std.err. 0.0034 0.0032 0.0033 0.0035 
Male Legals(t-1 )/1000  0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002   
std.err. 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
ICRG/100  -0.0207  -0.0221  -0.0203  -0.0180 
std.err. 0.0110 0.0113 0.0122 0.0122 
Dcrisis ×ICRG/100  -0.0125 -0.0125 -0.0127 -0.0131 
std.err. 0.0056 0.0056 0.0057 0.0057 
D macro crisis ×MICRG  _  -0.0012 -0.0029  _ 
std.err. _  0.0048 0.0051  _ 
Disaster  -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0026  _ 
std.err. 0.0027 0.0027 0.0028  _ 
Conflict  -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002  _ 
std.err. 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013  _ 
Famine  -0.0083 -0.0083 -0.0083  _ 
std.err. 0.0033 0.0034 0.0034  _ 
Year Dummies  No No Yes  Yes 
No. of observations  970 970 970 950 
Between groups R
2 0.306 0.327 0.336 0.309 
Note:  
Bold=significant at 95%   
Italics =significant at 90%     
Normal=not significant at 90% and 95%   
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Table 3 
Persistence of the crises effect through time (panel with random effects) 
 
  5 6 
Population   0.0165 0.0168 
Std.err. 0.0096 0.0107 
Per capita Income/1000    -0.0005 -0.0006 
std.err. 0.0003 0.0004 
Distance/1000 -0.0132  -0.0134 
Std.err. 0.0019 0.0021 
Distance/1000^2 0.0009  0.0009 
Std.err. 0.0002 0.0002 
Language: indo-european  0.0030 0.0044 
Std.err. 0.0037 0.0042 
Main religion: Christian  -0.0094  -0.0094 
Std.err. 0.0034 0.0038 
Male Legals(t-1)/1000 0.0002  0.0002 
std.err. 0.0001 0.0001 
ICRG (t-1)/100  -0.0310  _ 
std.err. 0.0117  _ 
Dcrisis ×ICRG(t-1)/100  -0.0127  _ 
std.err. 0.0053  _ 
ICRG (t-2)/100  _  -0.0199 
std.err. _  0.0118 
Dcrisis ×ICRG(t-2)  _  -0.0105 
std.err. _  0.0052 
Disaster(t-1)  -0.0046  _ 
std.err. 0.0028  _ 
Conflict(t-1)  -0.0004  _ 
std.err. 0.0012  _ 
Famine(t-1) -0.0074  _ 
std.err. 0.0033  _ 
Disaster(t-2)  _  -0.0026 
std.err. _  0.0027 
Conflict(t-2)  _  -0.0002 
std.err. _  0.0012 
Famine(t-2)  _  -0.0051 
std.err. _  0.0032 
Year Dummies   Yes Yes 
No. of observations  960 861 
Between groups R
2 0.323 0.316 
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